Thursday, August 21, 2014

Evolution as Development and the Demise of Darwin's Natural Selection Theory

The inhumanities of the Holocaust swept from public view the until-then popular cause of eugenics. But before World War II eugenics thrived as a civic cause in the United States and the United Kingdom. Improving human stock through selective breeding and the sterilizing, or even the euthenizing, of the "unfit" had come to be regarded widely as scientifically sound public policy. The Wikipedia entry for "eugenics"  provides an introduction to this mostly forgotten fashion of the times, which Nazi ideology took to extremes of horror and which today is banished, at least in its overt forms, from policy discussion, though social critics continue to uncover its covert forms & see embedded video below:
Advocacy of eugenics continues under the banner of population control and similar euphemisms.

The Anglo-American eugenicists of the early 20th century invoked Darwinian natural-selection theory to gird their ideological bent. But, according to the arguments and evidence that Alan Bennett presents in Evolution Revolution, these social engineers did not hijack Darwinism, nor twist it into service in a way to which Darwin would have objected. On the contrary, Darwin embraced the eugenicist agenda from the outset. Not only did Darwin himself promote eugenics, but the agenda's advocates also included Darwin's half-cousin, Francis Galton, who formalized the concept and propounded it as civic duty; Thomas Henry Huxley ("Darwin's Bulldog"); and Huxley's grandsons, Julian and Aldous Huxley, Julian serving for a time as president of the British Eugenics Society and Aldous sketching a blueprint for a caste society in his "Brave New World."

The objective of the Darwinian offensive was twofold, as Bennett summarizes:
  1. Cast the working class in the role of the unfit. 
  2. Denigrate religion. 
This history, the dark heart of Darwinian theory, presented in thoroughly referenced detail, makes up the first major portion of this book.

But the anti-Darwinian angle of Bennett's argument unwinds in a complicated way and extends beyond discrediting the motives of Darwin and his acolytes. That is, the attack is not merely ad hominem. Bennett establishes it as a point of historical fact that the concept of "descent with modification" had been around for some time prior to Darwin. Victorian society was not hostile to the idea of evolution, which it saw as evidence of God's wisdom, in His having crafted natural law so as to give rise to the diversity of life.

Neither was the mechanism of natural selection original with Darwin. It too was a concept familiar to Victorian scientists. But natural selection failed to gain traction as a scientific idea, before Darwin and his propagandists took up the cause, because the scientists of the day perceived that it was inadequate to account for the diversity of life. Under the influence of an optimizing mechanism, such as natural selection, they reasoned, phenotypes should converge, not diverge, with the passing of generations.

Natural selection theory never has rested on solid scientific evidence or reasoning. Although, by appealing to statistics and common prejudice, Darwinians grafted onto natural selection theory the trappings of a science. As a result, the sequentially amended theory became almost infinitely elastic in its capacity to absorb anomalous findings. It managed consistently to re-describe "how nature works" in ways contrived to preserve a niche for itself in the explanatory scheme. From the time Charles Darwin foisted it upon the world, natural selection theory effectively served the ideological ends of diverse brands of racists and elitists, despite its lack of scientific rigor.

However, if we follow Bennett in rejecting natural selection as the primary engine of evolution, then we are left with a process minus any explanation as to how it works. We still have to account for evolution's particular outcomes. Bennett proposes to fill the void, but the mechanism that he nominates to serve as evolution's centerpiece arrives with its own baggage.

Sunday, May 11, 2014

Chemtrails over Minneapolis, May 5, 2014

This was the sky over Minneapolis, the view from my alley.


I hiked over to the Ford Bridge, which connects Minneapolis and St. Paul, for a better view.



The planes kept coming. This fellow had a curious flight plan. Maybe he forgot his lunch.

Sunsets never looked like this before.


Saturday, April 19, 2014

Social Darwinism is Alive and Well, and it Dwells Between the Covers of this Book.

"The new forces, elevating in their nature though they be, do not act upon the social fabric from underneath, as was for a long time hoped and believed, but strike it at a point intermediate between top and bottom. It is as though an immense wedge were being forced, not underneath society, but through society. Those who are above the point of separation are elevated, but those who are below are crushed down."
— Henry George, Progress and Poverty
Move over 1984 and Brave New World. Tyler Cowen conjures his own bleak, dystopian future for humankind. Writing fiction is not his intent, but we have to hope that fiction he writes.

Cowen is an economist at George Mason University. He achieved fifteen minutes of fame via an e-book, The Great Stagnation in 2011. The e-book created a buzz loud enough to grab the attention of a publisher with a printing press. Stagnation insinuated its way between hard covers, from where it continued to make the case that a low-wage, slow-growth economy is something that the world had better get used to. It’s the new normal.

Average is Over, evidently a hurried sequel to Stagnation, reprises Cowen’s message: Extreme income inequality is here to stay. We can't tax the rich, after all, because they have too many channels through which to transfer the burden to the middle class and the poor.

Cowen offers up education as a tool that sub-millionaires might use to elevate themselves economically, but such education as Cowen conceives of might more candidly be called instruction, or schooling, or obedience training. So, operating in a bimodal economy—one that concentrates wealth at the tippy top and diffuses poverty across the broad bottom of the barrel, with no middle between—how does the top dispose of the barrel bottom? Cowen seems to think that that’s a problem to be solved and that he has a solution:
“What if someone proposed that in a few parts of the United States, in the warmer states, some city neighborhoods would be set aside for cheap living?”
Cowen describes the housing in these cheap zones as being modest but not ramshackle, and it all seems fuzzily commonsensical. But then,
“We also would build some makeshift structures there, similar to the better dwellings you might find in a Rio de Janeiro Favela. The quality of the water and electrical infrastructure might be low by American standards, though we could supplement the neighborhood with free municipal wireless (the future version of Marie Antoinette’s famous alleged phrase, “Let them watch internet!”) Hulu and other web-based TV services would replace more expensive cable connections for those residents. Then we would allow people to move there if they desired. In essence, we would be recreating a Mexico-like or Brazil-like environment in part the united States, although with some technological add-ons and most likely greater safety.”
Ok, so let’s fill another flute with bubbly and kick back to get a good look as the great unwashed descend ever deeper into collective poverty. It’s a kind of spectator sport for the well heeled, really. Let’s anticipate this decline in quality of life and contain the newly impoverished in ghettos modeled after Brazilian slums. If we call these habitats for impoverished humanity camps maybe they’ll seem almost recreational. Maybe FEMA would do a good job running these camps, keeping everything orderly and responding to emergencies. They might even cook up a motivational slogan. Maybe something like Arbeit Macht Frei.

No one should find the favela prospect objectionable, Cowen opines, after all, “no one is being forced to live in these places. Some people might prefer to live there. I might prefer to live there if my income were low enough.” He goes on to remind readers that some neighborhoods deteriorate naturally into shantytowns: “The end result is no different from the deliberate shantytowns already discussed.”

Deliberate shantytowns.

Let that cute phrase rattle around inside your skull.

Deliberate shantytowns.

What a striking public policy objective. Cowen wants his manufactured ghettos to be modeled after Brazilian favelas. So, how is it going for the residents of those South American slums? Maybe not so good. Could be better.

Sunday, February 23, 2014

You Are Being Stagnated: The social engineers are managing your standard-of-living expectations downwardly.

A pair of insidious memes is making the rounds in the mainstream media. These memes have to do with your standard of living, and they declare that the "Great Recession" is here to stay. George Mason University economist Tyler Cowen calls the persistent economic anemia, "The Great Stagnation," and in his book of that title he argues that we had better get used to hard times. The second meme of the pair is a corollary and is one of the primary legs on which Cowen's argument rests. This meme concerns "the end of innovation." All of humankind's potential inventions evidently already are with us. Or, at least we've picked all of the technological "low-hanging fruit." Innovations currently occupying the pipeline consist of embellishments; they are not game changers, like the inventions of the last century.

This assertion, about technological innovation, admittedly, invites debate, given the ongoing computerization of pretty much everything. Nonetheless, say the pessimists, for whatever reason, recent breakthroughs lack the economic potency of the technological breakthroughs of the early to middle twentieth century. Those innovations fueled deep and broad economic gains. More recent breakthroughs are of a different nature. They are hood ornaments glued onto tried-and-true technologies, and they concentrate their relatively meager economic gains selectively in the pockets of the already rich. Evidently, the "New Normal" applies only to the middle class and the poor. Cowen seems too cavalier about this implication of the new economic order: It's just the way the cookie crumbles.

Columnist Paul Krugman attributes much of the economic stagnation to a lack of demand for goods and services, essentially telling us that the legendary "job creators" won't be creating jobs any time soon, not until they see more cash in the pockets of prospective customers. If that's a major hold-up, keeping the economy from recovering, then putting cash in the pockets of consumers might be a good thing--the kind of economic stimulus that might work. If only that were the objective of the professional theoreticians and technicians "working" on the problem.

Despite these implications of Cowen's and Krugman's diagnoses, the prescription from both sides is simple: Get Used To It. Krugman glowingly cites economist and political advisor Lawrence (Larry) Summers as having arrived at the same conclusions about the New Normal and The End of Innovation. Now, there's a champion for the working bloke.

Push-back from the contrarians, those who reject the end-of-innovation premise, predictably cites the ubiquity of computing and communications technologies. The new devices have reshaped thoroughly the habits of consumers and big business alike. Computers streamline manufacturing and make comparison shopping as simple as swiping a touchscreen. The impact of the more recent technologies can hardly be said to pale next to that of the twentieth century's marvels. Nonetheless, the scope of their impact is easier to appreciate when one looks under the hood and sees that tiny little integrated circuit, or IC.

Saturday, December 21, 2013

Another case of evolutionary "pre-adaptation"

Rapid evolution of novel forms: Environmental
change triggers inborn capacity for adaptation

Let's see. A protein normally inhibits expression of genotypic "mutations" (that is, their expression into variant phenotypic traits). But under stress, production of the protein itself becomes suppressed and, as a result, more of the genotypic "mutations" become phenotypically expressed. And those "mutations", which have been riding along silently in the genome of this fish, having originated we know not how, just happen to include variants (when phenotypically expressed) that are adaptive in the environment that produces the stress.

It's just too pat. Carrying around a reservoir of unexpressed mutations? Just for fun? Just "in case"? Just "by chance"? I don't think so.


See report at   http://wi.mit.edu/news/archive/2013/rapid-evolution-novel-forms-environmental-change-triggers-inborn-capacity

Thursday, August 29, 2013

Breaking Bad Chemtrails

The scene at right occurs a few minutes into the episode, "Say My Name," in Season 5 of the cable TV show, "Breaking Bad".
In the screenshot, the lower right quadrant of the sky features four or more more-or-less parallel white streaks. Maybe stunt pilots just finished an air show. Who knows?
Maybe the streaks are just oddly configured cirrus clouds. Nah.
They can't be normal jet-engine contrails, because those dissipate too quickly. They wouldn't hang around long enough to share the sky with the next flights to come along in the same path.
Hmmmm . . . .
One thing these pop culture insertions accomplish is to help normalize the new sky.
The camera doesn't linger, so we can't know whether or not in an hour or so these streaks unfolded themselves into feathery, striated, filamentous, fields of rippled gauzy gray haze that finally swallow the sky. 

Sunday, July 21, 2013

The Braindead Megaphone. Or not.

The Braindead Megaphone is George Saunders' metaphor for mainstream corporate news and related media. Saunders' problem in crafting the metaphor is that he aims at, and hits, the wrong target. The braindead voice that irritates him is not an organic creature, but a connivance. Saunders acknowledges as much in the title essay, at least implicitly, and thereby undercuts the metaphor.

Saunders acknowledges that the media's braindead incantations are agenda driven: "[. . . ] it's clear that a significant and ascendant component of that voice has become bottom-dwelling, shrill, incurious, ranting, and agenda-driven." So, he's got himself into a contradiction, though you have to untangle the essay to get a good look at it.

He continues, "It strives to antagonize us, make us feel anxious, ineffective, and alone; convince us that the world is full of enemies and of people stupider and less agreeable than ourselves; is dedicated to the idea that, outside the sphere of our immediate experience, the world works in a different, more hostile, less knowable manner. This braindead tendency is viral . . . ."

Why would he characterize the deliberate undermining of an accurate picture of the world as reflecting braindeadness? The propaganda ministers who employ the megaphone are hardly braindead. How about crazy like a fox?

Saunders aims too low. He mistakes the messenger for the composer, the program for the programmer, the on-air personality reading a teleprompter for the executive directors of the telecommunications conglomerate who employ the teleprompter reader. The collage on the cover of the first paperback edition makes clear his target: the on-air script readers.

But these poor toilers are just reciters, pieces of the corporate complex's manufactured public face. Why does Saunders fail to target the people who write the scripts that the on-air personalities are forced to read? Or their bosses? Or theirs?  He calls the on-air personalities "informants," as if they possess information and share it in a spirit of civic mindedness, in a marketplace of ideas, hobbled only by their stupidity. Oh, and the profit motive. But they don't possess anything like information. They possess a knack for projecting an amiable facade. Witting or unwitting, they serve nonbraindead masters.

Sunday, July 14, 2013

AirFrance Advertisement for Chemtrails

You are looking at a photo of a sheet from the June 9, 2013, edition of the StarTribune newspaper, published in Minneapolis, MN. Left-hand page is page A8. Right- hand page is page A5.


Notice the advertisement that occupies the bottom half of page A5. It is an airline ad for AirFrance.
The grid of trails in the sky evokes patterns commonly associated with chemtrails, with the ropes from the swings contributing to the aerial coverage. The ad does not include any headline or body copy that references playground activity, vacationing, family travel, or anything to create a context for the kids on swings.  They are context-free props, but for the chemtrail ropes. Since this ad ran, the skies over the Minneapolis-St. Paul area have received extensive, repeated trail coverage.


What went through the mind of the graphic designer who laid out this ad, or the art director who approved it, or the agency rep who sold it to AirFrance? It is implausible to suppose that the reference to chemtrails is unintentional. If similar ads appear where you live, you might want to prepare for a heavy dose of heavy metals. 

A couple other points: 
Such images help normalize a conspicuously hash-marked sky. NASA  already is working to shape the perceptions of children, by conflating chemtrails and ordinary contrails. See here: http://mynasadata.larc.nasa.gov/804-2/contrail-watching-for-kids/

A common rebuttal to warnings about chemtrails is that they are equal-opportunity toxifiers, that not even the perpetrators could avoid inhaling the contents of the spays.  It might be that through advertisement, the perpetrators signal their cohorts as to where the whammy will fall, giving them fair warning to take a vacation or other leave of absence. 

Sunday, April 28, 2013

Is Natural Teleology Naturally a Secular Deity?

This frustrating exposition, after all, yields a satisfying conclusion. Nagel frustrates with his opaque writing style, and, nearly as frustrating, he rejects the NeoDarwinian account, when it comes to the origin of consciousness, rationality and value—yet retains it in his teleological alternative. That is, he schizophrenically honors the heart of the Darwinian doctrine, natural selection, while insisting that the doctrine is almost certainly wrong. Go figure.

I had hoped that Nagel would build on the critique that Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini put out there in their seemingly equally controversial book, "What Darwin Got Wrong." But Nagel dismisses the centerpiece of their attack—the incoherence of natural selection theory—cavalierly, to my mind, opining in a footnote that they misinterpret the theory. Really? How so? Now, that would be worth reading.

Which is not to say that the present book is not. When someone of Nagel's stature presents secular objections to the NeoDarwinian paradigm, feathers are bound to fly, as they do in any number of critical reviews of the book. Science seems to feel pressured to circle the wagons around the Darwinian account no matter the veracity of the counter arguments. It's time to take a break.

Conventional thinkers who keep natural selection theory at the top of their list of explanatory tools can use it to explain any aspect of organic nature. They need only contend that whatever is observed, say consciousness and rational thought, or blue feathers and big beaks, is as it is because that phenotypic trait was "more adaptive" than the alternatives expressed in the ancestral population. If in some instances that explanation seems implausible, then the explanation is “genetic drift.”

In any case, Nagel sidesteps this catch-all application of Darwinian reductionism by pointing out that nature from the outset must have had the potential to sprout living beings with minds. Nothing in conventional scientific thinking accounts for this potential inhering in nature. The prospect transcends the materialist, NeoDarwinian paradigm, or at least that's Nagel's contention.

Sunday, March 31, 2013

The Pagan States of America

The United States is a Christian nation, right? That's what the TV preachers tell us. Christianity might be good enough for the masses who toil in the private sector, but their masters who rule from the public sector look to the classical world for inspiration.

This struck me during a visit to the Minnesota state capitol building in St. Paul. The artwork inside the building's rotunda is uniformly and inescapably pagan. I take responsibility for the poor quality of the photos that follow, but the inherent pagan imagery is clear. Nothing Christian to be gleaned.






Outside the capitol building is the iconic gold-leafed copper and steel statuary group, "Progress of the State." According to the Minnesota Historical Society, "The four horses represent the power of nature: earth, wind, fire and water. The women symbolize civilization and the man standing on the chariot represents prosperity." Why should secular government pay homage to the elementals?  (image from the MN Historical Society web site)



And if you're visiting Minnesota's twin cities, be sure the check out the lower level of the old Hennepin County courthouse in downtown Minneapolis. There you'll find this impressive statue of the Father of Waters, a personification of that venerable elemental force, the Mighty Mississippi. 

 

A visit to the Wisconsin state capitol, in Madison, confronted me with similar imagery in the form of statuary, shown below.  

Where in all this are Adam and Eve? Noah and the ark? The exodus from Egypt? The arrival at the promised land?

Where's the immaculate conception? The loaves and fishes? The crucifixion and the ressurrection?

Isn't the United States a Christian nation?.     




I suppose that the dearth of Biblical imagery in seats of government has something to do with the notion of a Constitutional wall that separates church and state. And the reason pagans get a free ride might have to do with that word, "church," as opposed to, say, "temple." Curiously, Mormons maintain both churches and temples, covering the bases, I suppose.

In any case, it's clear that Christianity is good enough for Joe and Josephine Blow, but paganism the elite retains to itself for its own veneration.

Saturday, March 09, 2013

The Official Story: Narrating Public Myth, from PsyOps to NeurOps

August 4, 2013, update to this post: Narrative Science is a company that helps businesses communicate by turning data into stories. The company's software program, Quill, "is an artificial intelligence engine that generates, evaluates and gives voice to ideas as it discovers them in data." The company's website elaborates:
"Quill imports your data and builds an appropriate narrative structure to meet the goals of your audience. Using complex Artificial Intelligence algorithms, Quill extracts and organizes key facts and insights and transforms them into stories, at scale. Quill uses data to answer important questions, provide advice and deliver powerful insight in a precise, clear narrative."
That ability could come in handy. For the CIA. 

The intelligence agency's business-investment arm, In-Q-Tel, has contributed an undisclosed amount of funding to Narrative Science. My original post, below, might explain why the CIA is pursuing the engineering of stories. The agency is out to weaponize narrative.
* * *
Once upon a time, there was a public policy think tank at the University of Virginia, called the Miller Center. In October 1998, the Center invited historians, editors and journalists to mull over “the state of the art” in political history. There was a problem to be addressed, which apparently was that historical narrative had slipped through the hands of its rightful authors. And with it went those failing authors’ control of public sentiment. Implied in the conference’s mission was the felt need to figure out not only how this situation came about, but also how history’s rightful authors could recapture the historical narrative. Controlling narratives, people in high places seem to believe, facilitates controlling mass behavior, making it a subject worth study.

The Conference on Contemporary Political History kicked off with remarks from then director of the Miller Center, Philip Zelikow. (A few years later, during a leave from his directorship, Zelikow kept on a short leash the Kean-Hamilton Commission, also known as the 911 Commission, which he steered as its staff executive director.) In his opening remarks to the history conference, Zelikow laid out his concerns regarding contemporary political history:
“’Contemporary’” is defined functionally by those critical people and events that go into forming the public’s presumptions about its immediate past. This idea of ‘public presumption’ is akin to William McNeill’s notion of ‘public myth’ but without the negative implication sometimes invoked by the word ‘myth.’ Such presumptions are beliefs (1) thought to be true (although not necessarily known to be true with certainty), and (2) shared in common within the relevant political community. The sources for such presumptions are both personal (from direct experience) and vicarious (from books, movies, and myths).”
(All quotes from Zelikow are from the Miller Center Report, Vol. 14, No. 3, Winter 1999.) We will return later to McNeill and public myth. First, we need to follow Zelikow into the sources of public presumption. He identifies four:
”First, public presumptions can be ‘generational.’ They are formed by those pivotal events that become etched in the minds of those who have lived through them [. . . ]. The current set begins in approximately 1933, although the New Deal generation is fading. The Second World War and Vietnam, however, continue to resonate powerfully.
“Second, particularly ‘searing’ or ‘molding’ events take on ‘transcendent’ importance and, therefore, retain their power even as the experiencing generation passes from the scene. In the United States, beliefs about the formation of the nation and the Constitution remain powerful today, as do beliefs about slavery and the Civil War. World War II, Vietnam, and the civil rights struggle are more recent examples.
“Third, public presumptions often concern 'dramatic stories plucked out of time,' such as the Alamo, Pickett’s Charge, or the Titanic.
“Fourth, some public presumptions gain currency because they have a particular resonance for us today, either because they invoke powerful analogies to the present [. . . .] or because they offer a causal link and seem to explain ‘why we are the way we are today.’ Taken together, we see that presumptions that remain ‘contemporary’ are—with few exceptions from the 18th and 19th centuries—events and episodes from the last 60 years.”
Depending on which conspiracy theory one subscribes to, that of the Bush administration and the Kean–Hamilton Commission or some variety suggested by the 911 Truth Movement, it takes little imagination to perceive in Zelikow’s assessment a premonition or foreshadowing of events to come, his remarks about searing events taking on transcendent importance being uttered just three years prior to the attacks of 9/11.

And nowhere in his comments will one find any concern that public presumptions should reflect history accurately.

Sunday, March 03, 2013

Dis Cover Unworthy of Discover

Notice anything odd about this magazine cover?

The cover, which appears on Discover's March, 2013, issue, looks like something dredged from a 1950s science-fiction serial.  A guy in a suit lifting off to his next sales meeting represents Evolution's Next Stage? Does it get any more pedestrian, or vintage, than that? What's the next breakthroughlawn-mowing robots?

America's visionary futurists peered over the edgeand all I got was this lousy jet pack.

Is it really plausible that the editors behind this popular science magazine can't envision a future grander than one that might have dazzled them in grade school? Or, maybe technological deprivation is an idea that media owners would like us to get used to.

The cover image is so dated that its cheesiness looks insidious. Is it an artifact of the project to deliberately dumb us down? Another exercise in normalizing middle-class expectations of a stagnant-to-declining standard of living?

Surely the technological imagination can conjure something more exciting than this to sell us as Evolution's Next Stage. The next stage in evolution?  Try THIS.

Sunday, January 27, 2013

Natural Selection is Dead. Long Live Evolution.


Lecture: Evolution in Four Dimensions

Click the image for an excellent talk by Eva Jablonka, in which she describes provocative new findings in epigenetics and animal behavior. The findings move natural selection farther toward the periphery of evolutionary theory. Phenotypes, as they differetiate during evolution, seem to self-organize, as do the differentiating cells in a developing organism. My contention is that evolution and development resemble one another because they are two appearances of the same process, which is development.

If one could lay Darwin's concept of natural selection next to the current model of evolution, one would have a hard time finding much in common between them. Outside of the vaguest generalization of the evolutionary process, captured in Darwin's phrase, "Descent with modification," nothing much of the original formulation survives to contribute to the current model, the so-called Extended Synthesis.

Epigenetics, niche construction, phenotypic plasticity and other intriguing new developments in bioscience sit at the center of that synthesis and throw into question the foundations of the Darwinian model. Despite evolution theory's provisional character, however, the fossils record descent’s modifications, and they taunt us: What during descent accounts for these modifications?

Saturday, November 10, 2012

Pondering the Implausible: Conspiracy Skepticism and the Slothful Induction

If you believe a lie then learn you’ve been lied to, you feel betrayed, embarrassed and angry. Maybe you’re not the shrewd operator, after all. Maybe you’re just a chump.

This realization produces a discomfort that psychologists call cognitive dissonance. It happens when a person holds beliefs that are incompatible, as in “I am a shrewd operator” and “I’ve been chumped.” A wave of cognitive dissonance is washing over the U. S. electorate, as voters face up to their chumpdom.

The electorate is seeing that political and economic fundamentals rest on something other than which party perches on the branches of the U.S. government. Wings left and right fly in and out of office, but election wins of neither camp deflect entrenched trajectories:
  • The wealthy grow disproportionately wealthier and the workaday blokes correspondingly poorer.
  • U.S. troops and their private-sector surrogates occupy more foreign turf.  
  • Our sources of sustenance become increasingly adulterated.
My friends who navigate the evening news from the cargo bay of the left-right circus-train explain away the immunity of these trends to election results. Like UFO cultists whose deadline for the messianic rescue has come and gone, they circle the wagons tighter. It was a fluke, they say--the next time our team wins, that’s when things will change.

Fortunately, self-deception has its limits. 

 

Philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn found in the history of science examples of self-deception's limits, and he described what happens when those limits are breached.  In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn pointed out that when scientific experiments produce unexpected results, and eventually they will, then scientists explain away the anomalies, somehow or other, to preserve their foundational beliefs, what Kuhn called their paradigm. Scientists accommodate the anomalous results by amending the paradigm. In the above example, if “I am a shrewd operator” is the prevailing paradigm, and “I’ve been chumped” is an anomalous occurrence, then “I must have had a bad day” might be an adequate amendment to accommodate the anomalous data while preserving the paradigm.

But a paradigm can be stretched only so far. Eventually the anomalies, such as strings of coincidences or runs of bad days, accumulate beyond the elastic threshold of the paradigm, and it snaps. When that happens, the paradigm’s adherents convert or, eventually, die off, and a new generation adopts a new paradigm that accommodates the anomalous data.

The Structure of Political Revolutions. 

 

Politics, like science, rests on foundational beliefs, or paradigms. A majority of the electorate, for example, seems to believe that the ruling class comprises more or less decent human beings who act in good faith (more or less) toward the ruled. But when outcomes contradict this belief, when its expectations are not met, then the electorate stretches the paradigm to accommodate apparent acts of bad faith, such as, for example, a pile of broken campaign promises. 

A generally accepted amendment grants that our elected officials and their advisers are beneficent actors who act in good faith but are stupid. (This is the honest-but-stupid hypothesis.) Maybe they make big mistakes, because deep down they are boobs, or, more charitably, they just lack sufficient smarts to figure out how to keep their promises. The economy, the Middle East, the environment—it’s all so complicated. Sometimes things go wrong. The rulers mean well, but they bungle. Dang. Or, maybe they’re honest, well meaning and competent, but cowardly when opposed. (This variant is the honest-but-spineless hypothesis.)

Armed with these amendments, adherents of the prevailing paradigm can mitigate the dissonance created by anomalous outcomes. They can still gather and console themselves under the old paradigm. But the paradigm must have an elastic threshold; it cannot accommodate an infinite number of anomalous outcomes and amendments.

Sunday, September 23, 2012

Culture as Phenotype and Evolution's Crystal Ball

The issues are in the tissues.

A massage therapist once shared with me that piece of trade wisdom.  She was making a point about the interplay between mental and physical discomforts. She was not the first to see a relationship between bodily and psychological experiences.

Scottish Psychiatrist R. D. Laing in the 1960s and '70s, following onto Freud and Jung, proposed that early experiences inform not only personal psychopathologies but also the myths of the tribe. He was interested particularly in myths that share a pattern with the earliest—prenatal and early postnatal—experiences and suggested that these stories might recapitulate the adventures of zygotes, embryos, and fetuses.

Uterine Endometrium Adopting
The Newly Arrived Blastocyst
In The Facts of Life, Laing cited the story of Sargon. As an infant, the future king was placed by his parents in a reed basket and sent down river. He drifted until AKKI, the gardener, rescued him, and AKKI then raised the foundling to adulthood. The adult Sargon then stepped into the world to become king of Assyria. Laing, as have others, pointed out the parallels between this story and that of the biblical Moses. The infant Moses also was placed by his parents in a basket and set adrift, was adopted and raised by his rescuer and eventually left the home of the rescuer to assume a position of prominence.  Laing could have included among his examples a more contemporary hero, Superman, whose parents placed him as an infant into a "basket"—a rocket ship—and sent him downstream—through interstellar space—from the doomed planet, Krypton, to Earth, where the Earthlings Jonathan and Martha Kent discovered and adopted him. The Kents raised the infant, whom they named Clark, to adulthood. The adult Clark Kent then relocated from Smallville to Metropolis, where he assumed his superhero identity.

The stories recapitulate the journeys and development of the zygote, embryo, and fetus, suggested Laing. That is, the stories parallel the prenatal story: A zygote, encased in a membrane, called the zona pellucida, travels downstream—down the fallopian tube—until, as a blastocyst, it is adopted by the uterine endometrium. Attached to the uterus, it matures into a fetus, and at the right time it is born.

Laing also cites correspondence between Freud and Jung in which the psychoanalysts discussed another natal motif, that of the doppelganger, the hero's atrophied and subordinate twin. Examples of hero/doppelganger pairs include Gilgamesh and Enkidu, Romulus and Remus, and Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. Cain and Abel could be cited. The psychoanalysts interpreted the weak or unfortunate twin as representing that lost, discarded companion, the placenta.

Jung is most associated with the idea of the collective unconscious, but even Freud toyed with the idea of a phylogenetic memory. In a manuscript he shared with colleague Sandor Ferenczi and which was published posthumously as A Phylogenetic Fantasy, Freud speculated that some psychopathologies developed as reactions to conditions that prevailed during the ice ages.

From DNA to Phenotypes

The arrival of the first neurons provides the embryo with a mechanism, prospectively, that can record experiences, that is, with a memory. But the developmental stages prior to the appearance of the first neurons must record experiences by other means (if at all). Some other means must come into play also if phylogenetic memory can be a realistic prospect.

Masonic Pyramid Capstone Found


 The Masonic Pyramid, shown here as the Great Seal, searches for its capstone.

The all-seeking eye in the capstone's place has, thanks to NASA, extended its vision to the planet Mars

There, NASA's Curiosity robot explorer last week found a real treasure: The Missing Capstone, shown below.

The official story is leaked HERE. We await further developments.

Nice color close-up is posted at http://mardew.com/hires/MSL0044-2/
Click to Enlarge

Saturday, August 18, 2012

IrrationalWiki

The guardians of intellectual propriety at RationalWiki.org (un)kindly have taken notice of the star larvae hypothesis. Here are some of the things that you can learn about the hypothesis by reading its entry on the wiki.
  • It is a creationist hypothesis. (The star larvae hypothesis has no use for, nor does it address, supernaturalism, so how it qualifies as creationism is hard to figure, unless creationism has an infinitely elastic definition.)
  • Its mix of ideas includes “religious creationist arguments” and “paranormal topics.” (The hypothesis includes creationist arguments only insofar as it includes arguments that are critical of the theory of natural selection, but the criticisms of natural selection have no root in any religious consideration.  The hypothesis has no use for, nor does it address, paranormal topics, unless one is using “normal” in the Kuhnian sense, in which case any reference to anomalous data is a reference to something “para”normal.)
  • It is guilty of “quote mining and misrepresenting the Gaia hypothesis and panspermia ideas of Fred Hoyle.” (The hypothesis cites sources in the ordinary way that such presentations do. If there’s any mining, it’s in the sidebar quotes, but those are for color. They’re not essential to the hypothesis. The accusation of misrepresentation is strange, but mudslingers tend not to aim very carefully.)
  • It denies macroevolution and claims there are no transitional fossils. (This characterization could be made only by someone who has not read, or understood, the hypothesis.) 
And so on goes the entry, into assertions about the author’s lack of relevant education, his religious fundamentalism, and his paranoia about “a conspiracy by the scientific community to deny his hypothesis”. Actually, the scientific community doesn’t seem to have taken any notice of the hypothesis; I’d be thrilled if a scientist took time to bash it.

I can’t help but ponder the P.R. cliché about no publicity being bad publicity. Since the wiki entry appeared, visits to the star larvae site have ticked up a bit.

Sunday, July 08, 2012

Religion for Atheists

The atheist, armed with the methods of modern science, marches into battle against the forces of faith. That at least is the heroic fantasy of modern rationalism. I have a press kit (circa 1984) from the American Atheists organization, and on the cover is an illustration of atheist bulldog Madalyn Murray O'Hair, as a knight, lance in hand, standing on the corpse of a dragon named Religion.

The image of the heroic atheist is the archetypal opposite that of the religious believer. The believer is a psychological weakling, a child unable to cope with the world of rationality, of merely physical existence, and of other cold "facts" to be faced.

In Religion for Atheists, Alain de Botton, an atheist, acknowledges these images as cultural conventions and in doing so tries to lay the foundation for a rapprochement. Little in this book will hearten his fellow atheists, however. Instead, the author chooses to acknowledge, with great sympathy, the needy child in us all.

A triumphant Madalyn Murray O'Hair slays religion.



The result is an essay reminiscent of the writings of James Hillman. That is, the author is writing more as an archetypal psychologist, or anthropologist, than polemicist, the last being the mode or posture favored by the current crop of atheist provocateurs. Here is a passage in which the author distinguishes the baby of religious comfort from the bathwater of theological doctrine.

"Christianity describes the capacity to accept dependence as a mark of moral and spiritual health. Only the proud and vainglorious would attempt to deny their weaknesses, while the devout can declare without awkwardness, as a sign of their faith, that they have spent time in tears at the foot of a statue of a giant wooden mother. The cult of Mary recasts vulnerability as a virtue and thus corrects our habitual tendency to believe in a conclusive division between adult and childhood selves. At the same time, Christianity is appropriately delicate in the way it frames our needs. It allows us to partake of the comfort of the maternal without forcing us to face up to our lingering and inescapable desire for an actual mother. It makes no mention of our mother. It simply offers us the imaginative pleasure of being once again young, babied and cared for by a figure who is mater to the world."

There is more than a touch of Freud underlying such sentiments.

Throughout the book runs the theme of human neediness and the need to face that neediness with humility and to acknowledge the solace that religious customs and institutions provide. The author's thesis is that purely secular customs and institutions could provide the same comforts if secular society were to make the necessary social-engineering investments. But it is an act of faith to believe that, lacking theological foundations, a secular civilization could craft traditions equal in therapeutic efficacy to those crafted by the world's God-inspired religions. Whether God's existence is real or imagined doesn't bear on His capacity to inspire, or to comfort. With neither a real nor imagined God to lean on, secular society might never be able to pull off the author's therapeutic mission.

The author does identify a substantive common ground that serves the psychological needs of both the atheist unbelievers and the believers in things unseen. To the amusement and encouragement of the star larvae hypothesis, the author points to stars as a natural intersection of secular and religious concern:

"If such a process of re-evaluation [of calibrating our lives to cosmic standards] offers any common point of access open to both atheists and believers, it may be via an element in nature which is mentioned in both the Book of Job and Spinoza's Ethics: the stars. It is through their contemplation that the secular are afforded the best chance of experiencing redemptive feelings of awe. [. . . . ] Nightly -- perhaps after the main news bulletin and before the celebrity quiz -- we might observe a moment of silence in order to contemplate the 200 to 400 billion stars in our galaxy, the 100 billion galaxies and the 3 septillion stars in the universe. Whatever their value may be to science, the stars are in the end no less valuable to mankind as solutions to our megalomania, self-pity and anxiety."

To which we reply, piously, Amen. The author's instincts have delivered him to the promised land. We encourage him to cross into it.

We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.

Four Quartets: Little Gidding
T. S. Eliot

Friday, June 08, 2012

Fermi's Paradox meets Clarke's Law: Nature = Technology = Magic

In a blog posting earlier this year, Canadian science-fiction writer Karl Schroeder proposed to solve Fermi's paradox. The paradox has to do with the apparent absence of intelligent life in space.  "Where are they?" physicist Enrico Fermi famously asked. It would seem that civilizations millions of years older than Earth's should be conspicuous by their artifacts. Hence, the paradox. If they're out there, we must conclude, they're awfully tidy, which is how Schroeder wraps up the issue.

He proposes that advanced civilizations "go green" and integrate themselves into nature so perfectly that they remain hidden. Adapting Arthur C. Clarke's Third Law, Schroeder expresses his solution to Fermi's paradox as,
 "Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from nature." 
Clarke rendered his law originally as,
"Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."* 
So, anything that stumps our powers of explanation might be an instance of
1. A supernatural process
2. A natural process
3. An advanced technology

The challenge for us is to figure out what's what. That is, if any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from nature and from magic, then any sufficiently frustrating-to-science natural process will be indistinguishable from a sufficiently advanced technology and from magic. And any instance of magic we might mistake for a complex corner of nature or an advanced technology. For now, let's reserve magic as god of the gaps.

If a civilization's technology, designed by that civilization's intelligence, ever becomes so "green" that it becomes indistinguishable from nature, then it will have ended nature as something distinguishable from technology.  In such a universe we have no criteria by which to distinguish nature from advanced technologies, that is, from intelligent design. This restatement of Schroeder's point has a point, which is that we should cease debating naturalistic evolution versus intelligent design. We claim to have criteria by which to distinguish the two causes, based on their effects, but Schroeder's conjecture suggests otherwise.

The universe might be somebody's well-organized garbage dump, albeit not self-evidently so.  That's one interpretation. "Nature is somebody's science project," quips the star larvae home page. Another interpretation. Alternatively, we might see the universe as somebody's art work. Or somebody's magical conjuration. Or somebody's dream. Or whatever. Are these interpretations necessarily mutually exclusive? (The star larvae hypothesis proposes above all, as did Whitehead, a biological interpretation: nature—the universe—as organism.)

The multiplicity of interpretations leads to a metaconclusion, perhaps, which is that we perceive the world through the lens of our instincts, conditioned biases, temperamental leanings and so on. Nothing profound there. But when we ponder the universe as a whole, the vastness of the object accommodates all conceptual frames. The concept of universe is an epistemological black hole.

The star larvae hypothesis embraces Schroeder's interpretation of Fermi's paradox because it points in a promising direction. But the hypothesis plays favorites. Schroeder says high-tech civilizations hide their garbage in plain view but camouflaged as nature.  The star larvae hypothesis says high-tech civilizations simply ARE nature. Nature is high tech.  Both narratives, though differing in their figure/ground designations, point to a common conclusion: If you want to see where technology is headed, look to nature.

The star larvae hypothesis invites us to contemplate the twinkles that dot the night sky and see the canopy not as housing, or hiding, technological civilizations but as comprising civilian technicians, engineered bodies abiding, alive.
_______________________________________

*Clarke's first two laws, worth pondering in their own right, are (1) "When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is possible, he is almost certainly right. When he states that something is impossible, he is very probably wrong;" and (2) "The only way of discovering the limits of the possible is to venture a little way past them into the impossible."

Sunday, May 20, 2012

Part 2: "How Do Phenotypes Get To Be How They Get To Be? (or) Is Natural Selection Biology's Phlogiston?"

I submitted the previous blog post to Bjørn Østman's Carnival of Evolution. My submission did not please Mr. Østman, and he expressed his displeasure through comments posted on this blog. His comments were similar to those that the post received on www.thescienceforum.com. Both sources of commentary accused me of mischaracterizing the theory of natural selection. But unlike those on the forum, the comments of Mr. Østman mostly were informed and thoughtful.
Mr. Østman explained that I had failed to distinguish between natural selection and genetic drift. These processes participate in distributing genes, but they are distinct mechanisms, according to the normal view. He offered some details about how researchers distinguish the twothat is, about how they decide when to attribute the distribution of a gene (or allele) or a phenotypic trait primarily to drift or to selection. Despite his clarifications, and I appreciate the time he took, the criteria apparently typically used to distinguish the two mechanisms seem not really to be able to do so. The argument:
Two mechanisms are proposed as the primary causal trendsetters in gene (allele) and trait distribution. These mechanisms are genetic drift, a random process, and  natural selection, a nonrandom process. The latter explains the advance and retreat of traits in populations in terms of adaptation and fitness. The former explains the ebb and flow of traits in terms of chance. Given shifting trait frequencies through generations (in a local population of a given species), how does one distinguish outcomes due to natural selection from outcomes due to genetic drift?

Apparently one does so by determining whether a particular genotype or phenotype is more fit than a competing genotype or phenotype (in the local population of the given species). One does this by comparing the number of fertile progeny left behind by individuals with the one genotype or phenotype with the number of fertile progeny left behind by individuals with the other genotype or phenotype. The ratio is a measure of fitness of the types relative to one another. Phenotypes with similar traits also can be grouped, and averages taken.

Genotype/phenotype variants associated with a small fitness advantage (slightly better reproductive success) will tend to spread more rapidly in a small population but more slowly in a large population, due to greater opportunity for random mixing, or drift, in the large population. So, if a spreading gene or trait is associated with even a small fitness advantage, then the spread of the gene or trait in a small population can be taken to be a case natural selection. But in a large population, the advantage must be large for selection to be given credit for the spread of a gene or trait.

In other words, when the ratio of the fitness advantage to the population size crosses a threshold, then natural selection gets credit for the spread of the gene or trait, otherwise the spread is attributed to drift, or some other mechanism.

Whatever the merits of such a threshold-crossing formula, it cannot distinguish among mechanisms. Like the difference between a sluggish economy and a recession, or between the outbreak of a disease and an epidemic, or between a planet and a Pluto, the distinction between genetic drift and natural selection rests on an arbitrary threshold. It's a taxonomic distinction based on a variance from a statistical baseline. It's just a convenient way to label distribution ranges.

The differential labeling in the case of drift vs. selection is supposed to imply that a qualitative distinction is being used to distinguish two mechanisms, but nothing about the formula or its application entails that there be a qualitative distinction between or among proposed mechanisms. A difference of mechanism is implied, but there's no there there. In short, the formulas of population genetics can distinguish statistically among outcome distributions and assign labels to various distribution ranges, but that's about it.

To claim that such a formula justifies a theory of how phenotypes get to be how they get to be due to adaptation and fitness—that the formula informs us as to when changes in phenotypes are due to selection or to drift—really does beg the question, because it assumes that, among differing genotypes and phenotypes, differences in reproductive success (when they cross a statistical threshold) are DUE TO the differences among the genotypes and phenotypes of previous generations, specifically due to their relative adaptiveness. But to draw causal inferences from statistical results is some kind of logical fallacy.

I can't even say that it's assuming causation from correlation, because there's no correlation. We can't say that certain outcomes are correlated with drift and other outcomes are correlated with selection and that therefore each proposed mechanism causes the correlated outcome. The problem is that the item in question—natural selection—is taken from the outset as being a mechanism available for explaining gene distributions. Wouldn't one have to establish first that it's actually available, before one moves on to the question of which criteria distinguish it from other mechanisms? My argument is that it's not there; it's not available, unless it's just another name for the observation that some creatures enjoy more reproductive success than others, which we know is the primary cause of gene and trait distributions.

So, if natural selection cannot be the primary mechanism of macroevolution, what might be? Unlike various mechanisms that have been proposed, such as the ongoing and contingent interplay of endogenous and environmental variables called natural history ("just one damn thing after another"—this solution is proposed by Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini in "What Darwin Got Wrong", from which I appropriated the phrase, how phenotypes get to be how they get to be), or the deliberate intervention of alien intelligences, or one of the other proposals listed HERE, the star larvae hypothesis proposes a mechanism that not only agrees with the latest discoveries in genetics, epigenetics, and the growing sense among researchers that environmental influences should be downplayed and endogenous factors emphasized in accounting for phenotypes (this is the gist of the papers collected in "Evolution, The Extended Synthesis"), but also accounts for evolution's apparent directionality.

The star larvae hypothesis proposes that evolution comprises stages of a developmental life cycle.

Monday, April 23, 2012

How Do Phenotypes Get To Be How They Get To Be? (or) Is Natural Selection Biology's Phlogiston?

Some creatures (and some plants) enjoy more reproductive success than others. This variability in reproductive success determines the allotments of genes that the next generation inherits. Specifically, the next generation inherits more of the genes of the more successful reproducers, and it inherits fewer of the genes of the less successful reproducers. These varying inheritances express themselves as various distributions of phenotypic traits, and that explains how phenotypes get to be how they get to be. (Read for "genes" shorthand for DNA, epigenetic markers and whatever else constitutes the machinery of inheritance.)

So far so good for the theory of natural selection. But the truisms raise a question: Why do some creatures (and some plants) enjoy more reproductive success than others?

The theory of natural selection assumes and asserts that reproductive success is a function of heritable phenotypic traits. According to the theory, variability among the heritable phenotypic traits in a local population causes the members of the population to exhibit variable reproductive success. Heritable phenotypic traits affect reproductive success by interacting with the environments in which their bearers live. A longer neck reaches higher fruits; a sharper eye detects more hidden prey, and so on. This is how traits lead to reproductive success, according to the theory.

But this explanation begs more questions. Which attributes of a creature constitute phenotypic "traits"? And why should the heritable ones be credited with determining reproductive success?

We coin a term, "trait", and identify, say, nose length, as one. We coin a term, "adaptation," and declare that a long (or short) nose is one. Its degree of adaptation relates the trait to "fitness," which determines reproductive success, which is a measure of the given creature's progeny: their number and viability and fertility.

If we measure the noses of a generation of offspring, we might find an over-representation of nose-types associated with certain members of the parental generation. Natural selection theorists would regard this outcome as testifying to the reproductive success of those members of the parental generation, which would testify to their fitness, which would testify to their being adapted, which would testify to their possessing nose lengths within some range. To repeat: Reproductive success is a function of fitness, which is a function of adaptation, which is a function of heritable traits, goes the theory.

The elaboration begs more questions: Which heritable traits are the adaptive ones? We can't say, offhand, because we can't distinguish between adaptive traits and other traits until we measure reproductive success. Once we do that, then we can credit whatever traits are overrepresented in the offspring generation with being adaptive and thereby conferring the fitness that led to the reproductive success of their earlier bearers. But we can credit traits with being adaptive only after reproductive success is measured, if we are to evaluate the theory of natural selection by its own terms.

Wednesday, February 22, 2012

Libertarian Illusions - Debunking the Public/Private Paradigm

Libertarian ideology, that thing supposedly that distinguishes Ron Paul's principles from those of other Republicans, rests on its own faulty principles. Libertarianism distinguishes between something that it calls the public sector and something that it calls the private sector. But the so-called sectors differ only by decree; operationally they feed the same circuit. The categories by which libertarian ideology defines itself are not essential nor foundational nor substantive in any regard. They are merely nominal, maybe even only ceremonial, as in a hoodwink. Libertarian ideology is a house of cards build on sand. The question is whether libertarians devote themselves to an honest mistake or engineer diversionary dissents to stifle real reform.

Corporations, those mainstays of the so-called private sector, are, after all, progeny of the government. It is the government that grants to enterprises various legal designations by which they derive competitive advantages. These designations are the familiar titles of C-Corporation, S-Corporation, holding company, limited liability corporation, nonprofit, and so forth. Entrepreneurs regularly appeal to the government to grant them charters of incorporation or any of these other favorable designations. And this governmental bestowal of favors, which is what it is, unto enterprises constitutes governmental intrusion into markets as much as does any ostensibly "anti-business" regulatory intervention.

Suppose that a vision inspires you to design a new style of widget, and you dutifully manufacture this widget. Go ahead. Secure the equipment, install it in your garage and produce widgets. Congratulations, you are an entrepreneur, enterprising away in the private sector.

But, there's a complication . . . .

Saturday, January 07, 2012

It Can't Happen Here (Until . . . . )

America's ongoing descent into a corporate state roused me finally to pick up "It Can't Happen Here", Sinclair Lewis' cautionary novel about the rise of a Fascist regime in the United States.  Published in 1935, when Fascism already had rooted itself in Europe, the story captures troubling tendencies in American popular media and popular mentality. Think demagoguery and mob psychology.

The passage below testifies to the timeliness of Lewis' cautions. Senator Windrip is a political rising star who runs for president and whose ascendance is fueled by his skillful exploitation of jingoism and other populist sentiments. Speaking is R. C. Crowley, the local banker of Fort Beulah. He is addressing an informal gathering of the modest town's professional class. But in particular he is addressing a skeptical Doremus Jessup, the local newspaperman and the novel's protagonist.
"I don't like all these irresponsible attacks on us bankers all the time. Of course, Senator Windrip has to pretend publicly to bawl the banks out, but once he gets into power he'll give the banks their proper influence in the administration and take our expert financial advice. Yes. Why are you so afraid of the word 'Fascism,' Doremus? Just a word—just a word! And might not be so bad, with all the lazy bums we got panhandling relief nowadays, and living on my income tax and yours—not so worse to have a real Strong Man, like Hitler or Mussolini—like Napoleon or Bismarck in the good old days—and have 'em really run the country and make it efficient and prosperous again."
How well does this shoe fit the politics of the United States in 2012?

Then Lewis comments on the integrity of political campaigns, when a Windrip supporter admits that the candidate's promises amount to air, "just molasses for the cockroaches." 

Then there's this timely partisan snipe, from the mouth of Karl Pascal, the Communist,
". . . Freedom, Order, Security, Discipline, Strength! All those swell words that even before Windrip came in the speculators started using to protect their profits! Especially how they used the word 'Liberty'! Liberty to steal the didies off the babies! I tell you, an honest man gets sick when he hears the word "Liberty' today, after what the Republicans did to it!" 
I'm just sayin'.

Saturday, December 17, 2011

The capitalist enterprise needs to rid itself of the monetary parasitism of private banking

The page at left is from Money and Banking, a publication in the Everyday Economics series put out by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. This section, called How Banks Create Money, begins,

"Banks actually create money when they lend it. Here's how it works: Most of a bank's loans are made to its own customers and are deposited in their checking accounts. Because the loan becomes a new deposit, just like a paycheck does, the bank once again holds a small percentage of that new amount in reserve and again lends the remainder to someone else, repeating the money-creation process many times."

This sounds innocent enough, but notice the peculiar nature of the money that banks create. The money exists entirely as debt. When you take out a loan from a bank, you owe the money back to the bank. With interest.

Notice that the bank does not loan you money that it has sitting in some vault. When you take out a loan, the bank merely credits your account. It makes credit appear. In exchange for your new indebtedness (that, after all is what your loan is, a debt that you owe to the bank), you get to put up collateral, often your home. 

If you pay back the loan, then the bank possesses the money (your payment), which it now owes to no one, even though your incurring a debt brought the money into existence in the first place. The bank also possesses the interest you paid.

If you don't meet the terms of the loan, then the bank takes possession of your collateral, a real asset that it acquires through no risk or sacrifice on its part.

For these reasons, it cannot be said that banks earn their money. To say that they do is to obliterate any sense of the word, "earn". The money-creation system described here (fractional reserve lending of monetized debt), subverts the capitalist virtue of earning one's money. Banks might "earn" their money, but they do not earn it. Banks are the enemy of capitalism, and the capitalist enterprise needs to rid itself of the monetary parasitism of private banking.

Sunday, November 27, 2011

The Ballad of Marshall McLuhan


The Ballad of Marshall McLuhan from Randall Acronym on Vimeo, a footnote to very good lecture, below, by McLuhan scholar Arjen Mulder, on McLuhan's ideas with commentary on his Catholicism.  All from V2_, an interdisciplinary center for art and media technology in Rotterdam, Netherlands.

Sunday, October 16, 2011

The Medea Hypothesis: Is Life on Earth Ultimately Self-Destructive?

After wasting pages on an ad hominen argument that belabors the New Age movement's adoption of James Lovelock's Gaia hypothesis, Ward finally gets down to the serious business of trying to refute/debunk Lovelock's hypothesis.

The Gaia hypothesis, varying from weak to strong versions, involves the notion that Earth's biosphere actively regulates the chemistry and temperature of its fluid environment--the atmosphere and oceans--to keep the planet bio-friendly. Ward cites extreme fluctuations in atmospheric chemistry and temperature in Earth's past, ascertained from geological evidence, and proposes mechanisms by which the biosphere's own metabolic processes could have contributed to the extremes. The extremes reduced Earth's overall biomass, and, so Ward argues, the biosphere not only fails to maintain a healthy environment for itself, but positively contributes to disrupting the environment and reducing the planet's biomass. Hence, the Gaia hypothesis is disproven and Ward's Medea hypothesis, that life poisons its environment and so is inherently suicidal, is corroborated.

The argument is not convincing for a few reasons. For one thing, life always participates in anabolic (building up) and catabolic (tearing down) processes. The two feed each other, and the combined system is called metabolism. To focus on the downside is not to discredit the circuit.

Ward settles on biomass as the "bottom line" measure of the health of the biosphere. But do we assess the health of any organism solely by mass? Evolution has produced advanced technological civilization. What more could be expected from a living planet? More and more and more bacterial tonnage? Biomass per se is not an indicator of anything in particular, except biomass.

In a previous book, Ward (and co-author Donald Brownlee) suggested that glaciations serve evolution as genetic filters, weeding out the less fit. So he's familiar with the idea that die-offs can serve a constructive evolutionary purpose, even if they reduce biomass.

What Ward fails to address, and what is central to Lovelock's original idea, is the anomalous resistance of Earth's fluid environment to entropy. Why are the atmosphere and oceans not sitting stable in a state of chemical equilibrium after all these millions of years? Volcanism, mineral erosion and other geochemical processes continually stir the pot, but surely it is an oddity that the random variability never has crossed a threshold that would've sterilized Earth.

Part of Ward's problem seems to be that he fails to connect Gaia with evolution.

A fetus also pollutes its environment, and up to a point it's not a problem, because the environment not only is set up to handle the toxins, but also positively to support the developing life. Up to a point. A fetus that stays in the womb too long becomes Medean--life threatening--at which time it needs to move to a more accommodating environment.

That's the situation we're in.

Ward has no enthusiasm for space colonization, but thinks it's wiser to try to adapt to this planetary womb. Such short-sighted thinking definitely is Medean. Ward's book presents a half-baked recipe for a self-fulfilling stew.