The scene at right occurs a few minutes into the episode, "Say My Name," in Season 5 of the cable TV show, "Breaking Bad".
In the screenshot, the lower right quadrant of the sky features four or more more-or-less parallel white streaks. Maybe stunt pilots just finished an air show. Who knows?
Maybe the streaks are just oddly configured cirrus clouds. Nah.
They can't be normal jet-engine contrails, because those dissipate too quickly. They wouldn't hang around long enough to share the sky with the next flights to come along in the same path.
Hmmmm . . . .
One thing these pop culture insertions accomplish is to help normalize the new sky.
The camera doesn't linger, so we can't know whether or not in an hour or so these streaks unfolded themselves into feathery, striated, filamentous, fields of rippled gauzy gray haze that finally swallow the sky.
Thursday, August 29, 2013
The scene at right occurs a few minutes into the episode, "Say My Name," in Season 5 of the cable TV show, "Breaking Bad".
Sunday, July 21, 2013
Saunders acknowledges that the media's braindead incantations are agenda driven: "[. . . ] it's clear that a significant and ascendant component of that voice has become bottom-dwelling, shrill, incurious, ranting, and agenda-driven." So, he's got himself into a contradiction, though you have to untangle the essay to get a good look at it.
He continues, "It strives to antagonize us, make us feel anxious, ineffective, and alone; convince us that the world is full of enemies and of people stupider and less agreeable than ourselves; is dedicated to the idea that, outside the sphere of our immediate experience, the world works in a different, more hostile, less knowable manner. This braindead tendency is viral . . . ."
Why would he characterize the deliberate undermining of an accurate picture of the world as reflecting braindeadness? The propaganda ministers who employ the megaphone are hardly braindead. How about crazy like a fox?
Saunders aims too low. He mistakes the messenger for the composer, the program for the programmer, the on-air personality reading a teleprompter for the executive directors of the telecommunications conglomerate who employ the teleprompter reader. The collage on the cover of the first paperback edition makes clear his target: the on-air script readers.
But these poor toilers are just reciters, pieces of the corporate complex's manufactured public face. Why does Saunders fail to target the people who write the scripts that the on-air personalities are forced to read? Or their bosses? Or theirs? He calls the on-air personalities "informants," as if they possess information and share it in a spirit of civic mindedness, in a marketplace of ideas, hobbled only by their stupidity. Oh, and the profit motive. But they don't possess anything like information. They possess a knack for projecting an amiable facade. Witting or unwitting, they serve nonbraindead masters.
Sunday, July 14, 2013
Notice the advertisement that occupies the bottom half of page A5. It is an airline ad for AirFrance.
The grid of trails in the sky evokes patterns commonly associated with chemtrails, with the ropes from the swings contributing to the aerial coverage. The ad does not include any headline or body copy that references playground activity, vacationing, family travel, or anything to create a context for the kids on swings. They are context-free props, but for the chemtrail ropes. Since this ad ran, the skies over the Minneapolis-St. Paul area have received extensive, repeated trail coverage.
What went through the mind of the graphic designer who laid out this ad, or the art director who approved it, or the agency rep who sold it to AirFrance? It is implausible to suppose that the reference to chemtrails is unintentional. If similar ads appear where you live, you might want to prepare for a heavy dose of heavy metals.
A couple other points:
Such images help normalize a conspicuously hash-marked sky. NASA already is working to shape the perceptions of children, by conflating chemtrails and ordinary contrails. See here: http://mynasadata.larc.nasa.gov/804-2/contrail-watching-for-kids/
A common rebuttal to warnings about chemtrails is that they are equal-opportunity toxifiers, that not even the perpetrators could avoid inhaling the contents of the spays. It might be that through advertisement, the perpetrators signal their cohorts as to where the whammy will fall, giving them fair warning to take a vacation or other leave of absence.
Sunday, April 28, 2013
I had hoped that Nagel would build on the critique that Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini put out there in their seemingly equally controversial book, "What Darwin Got Wrong." But Nagel dismisses the centerpiece of their attack—the incoherence of natural selection theory—cavalierly, to my mind, opining in a footnote that they misinterpret the theory. Really? How so? Now, that would be worth reading.
Which is not to say that the present book is not. When someone of Nagel's stature presents secular objections to the NeoDarwinian paradigm, feathers are bound to fly, as they do in any number of critical reviews of the book. Science seems to feel pressured to circle the wagons around the Darwinian account no matter the veracity of the counter arguments. It's time to take a break.
Conventional thinkers who keep natural selection theory at the top of their list of explanatory tools can use it to explain any aspect of organic nature. They need only contend that whatever is observed, say consciousness and rational thought, or blue feathers and big beaks, is as it is because that phenotypic trait was "more adaptive" than the alternatives expressed in the ancestral population. If in some instances that explanation seems implausible, then the explanation is “genetic drift.”
In any case, Nagel sidesteps this catch-all application of Darwinian reductionism by pointing out that nature from the outset must have had the potential to sprout living beings with minds. Nothing in conventional scientific thinking accounts for this potential inhering in nature. The prospect transcends the materialist, NeoDarwinian paradigm, or at least that's Nagel's contention.
Sunday, March 31, 2013
This struck me during a visit to the Minnesota state capitol building in St. Paul. The artwork inside the building's rotunda is uniformly and inescapably pagan. I take responsibility for the poor quality of the photos that follow, but the inherent pagan imagery is clear. Nothing Christian to be gleaned.
I suppose that the dearth of Biblical imagery in seats of government has something to do with the notion of a Constitutional wall that separates church and state. And the reason pagans get a free ride might have to do with that word, "church," as opposed to, say, "temple." Curiously, Mormons maintain both churches and temples, covering the bases, I suppose.
In any case, it's clear that Christianity is good enough for Joe and Josephine Blow, but paganism the elite retains to itself for its own veneration.
Saturday, March 09, 2013
August 4, 2013, update to this post: Narrative Science is a company that helps businesses communicate by turning data into stories. The company's software program, Quill, "is an artificial intelligence engine that generates, evaluates and gives voice to ideas as it discovers them in data." The company's website elaborates:"Quill imports your data and builds an appropriate narrative structure to meet the goals of your audience. Using complex Artificial Intelligence algorithms, Quill extracts and organizes key facts and insights and transforms them into stories, at scale. Quill uses data to answer important questions, provide advice and deliver powerful insight in a precise, clear narrative."That ability could come in handy. For the CIA.
The intelligence agency's business-investment arm, In-Q-Tel, has contributed an undisclosed amount of funding to Narrative Science. My original post, below, might explain why the CIA is pursuing the engineering of stories. The agency is out to weaponize narrative.
The Conference on Contemporary Political History kicked off with remarks from then director of the Miller Center, Philip Zelikow. (A few years later, during a leave from his directorship, Zelikow kept on a short leash the Kean-Hamilton Commission, also known as the 911 Commission, which he steered as its staff executive director.) In his opening remarks to the history conference, Zelikow laid out his concerns regarding contemporary political history:
“’Contemporary’” is defined functionally by those critical people and events that go into forming the public’s presumptions about its immediate past. This idea of ‘public presumption’ is akin to William McNeill’s notion of ‘public myth’ but without the negative implication sometimes invoked by the word ‘myth.’ Such presumptions are beliefs (1) thought to be true (although not necessarily known to be true with certainty), and (2) shared in common within the relevant political community. The sources for such presumptions are both personal (from direct experience) and vicarious (from books, movies, and myths).”(All quotes from Zelikow are from the Miller Center Report, Vol. 14, No. 3, Winter 1999.) We will return later to McNeill and public myth. First, we need to follow Zelikow into the sources of public presumption. He identifies four:
”First, public presumptions can be ‘generational.’ They are formed by those pivotal events that become etched in the minds of those who have lived through them [. . . ]. The current set begins in approximately 1933, although the New Deal generation is fading. The Second World War and Vietnam, however, continue to resonate powerfully.
“Second, particularly ‘searing’ or ‘molding’ events take on ‘transcendent’ importance and, therefore, retain their power even as the experiencing generation passes from the scene. In the United States, beliefs about the formation of the nation and the Constitution remain powerful today, as do beliefs about slavery and the Civil War. World War II, Vietnam, and the civil rights struggle are more recent examples.
“Third, public presumptions often concern 'dramatic stories plucked out of time,' such as the Alamo, Pickett’s Charge, or the Titanic.
“Fourth, some public presumptions gain currency because they have a particular resonance for us today, either because they invoke powerful analogies to the present [. . . .] or because they offer a causal link and seem to explain ‘why we are the way we are today.’ Taken together, we see that presumptions that remain ‘contemporary’ are—with few exceptions from the 18th and 19th centuries—events and episodes from the last 60 years.”Depending on which conspiracy theory one subscribes to, that of the Bush administration and the Kean–Hamilton Commission or some variety suggested by the 911 Truth Movement, it takes little imagination to perceive in Zelikow’s assessment a premonition or foreshadowing of events to come, his remarks about searing events taking on transcendent importance being uttered just three years prior to the attacks of 9/11.
And nowhere in his comments will one find any concern that public presumptions should reflect history accurately.
Sunday, March 03, 2013
The cover, which appears on Discover's March, 2013, issue, looks like something dredged from a 1950s science-fiction serial. A guy in a suit lifting off to his next sales meeting represents Evolution's Next Stage? Does it get any more pedestrian, or vintage, than that? What's the next breakthrough—lawn-mowing robots?
America's visionary futurists peered over the edge—and all I got was this lousy jet pack.
Is it really plausible that the editors behind this popular science magazine can't envision a future grander than one that might have dazzled them in grade school? Or, maybe technological deprivation is an idea that media owners would like us to get used to.
The cover image is so dated that its cheesiness looks insidious. Is it an artifact of the project to deliberately dumb us down? Another exercise in normalizing middle-class expectations of a stagnant-to-declining standard of living?
Surely the technological imagination can conjure something more exciting than this to sell us as Evolution's Next Stage. The next stage in evolution? Try THIS.
Sunday, January 27, 2013
Lecture: Evolution in Four Dimensions
Click the image for an excellent talk by Eva Jablonka, in which she describes provocative new findings in epigenetics and animal behavior. The findings move natural selection farther toward the periphery of evolutionary theory. Phenotypes, as they differetiate during evolution, seem to self-organize, as do the differentiating cells in a developing organism. My contention is that evolution and development resemble one another because they are two appearances of the same process, which is development.
If one could lay Darwin's concept of natural selection next to the current model of evolution, one would have a hard time finding much in common between them. Outside of the vaguest generalization of the evolutionary process, captured in Darwin's phrase, "Descent with modification," nothing much of the original formulation survives to contribute to the current model, the so-called Extended Synthesis.
Epigenetics, niche construction, phenotypic plasticity and other intriguing new developments in bioscience sit at the center of that synthesis and throw into question the foundations of the Darwinian model. Despite evolution theory's provisional character, however, the fossils record descent’s modifications, and they taunt us: What during descent accounts for these modifications?
Saturday, November 10, 2012
This realization produces a discomfort that psychologists call cognitive dissonance. It happens when a person holds beliefs that are incompatible, as in “I am a shrewd operator” and “I’ve been chumped.” A wave of cognitive dissonance is washing over the U. S. electorate, as voters face up to their chumpdom.
The electorate is seeing that political and economic fundamentals rest on something other than which party perches on the branches of the U.S. government. Wings left and right fly in and out of office, but election wins of neither camp deflect entrenched trajectories:
- The wealthy grow disproportionately wealthier and the workaday blokes correspondingly poorer.
- U.S. troops and their private-sector surrogates occupy more foreign turf.
- Our sources of sustenance become increasingly adulterated.
Fortunately, self-deception has its limits.
Philosopher of science Thomas Kuhn found in the history of science examples of self-deception's limits, and he described what happens when those limits are breached. In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn pointed out that when scientific experiments produce unexpected results, and eventually they will, then scientists explain away the anomalies, somehow or other, to preserve their foundational beliefs, what Kuhn called their paradigm. Scientists accommodate the anomalous results by amending the paradigm. In the above example, if “I am a shrewd operator” is the prevailing paradigm, and “I’ve been chumped” is an anomalous occurrence, then “I must have had a bad day” might be an adequate amendment to accommodate the anomalous data while preserving the paradigm.
But a paradigm can be stretched only so far. Eventually the anomalies, such as strings of coincidences or runs of bad days, accumulate beyond the elastic threshold of the paradigm, and it snaps. When that happens, the paradigm’s adherents convert or, eventually, die off, and a new generation adopts a new paradigm that accommodates the anomalous data.
The Structure of Political Revolutions.
Politics, like science, rests on foundational beliefs, or paradigms. A majority of the electorate, for example, seems to believe that the ruling class comprises more or less decent human beings who act in good faith (more or less) toward the ruled. But when outcomes contradict this belief, when its expectations are not met, then the electorate stretches the paradigm to accommodate apparent acts of bad faith, such as, for example, a pile of broken campaign promises.
A generally accepted amendment grants that our elected officials and their advisers are beneficent actors who act in good faith but are stupid. (This is the honest-but-stupid hypothesis.) Maybe they make big mistakes, because deep down they are boobs, or, more charitably, they just lack sufficient smarts to figure out how to keep their promises. The economy, the Middle East, the environment—it’s all so complicated. Sometimes things go wrong. The rulers mean well, but they bungle. Dang. Or, maybe they’re honest, well meaning and competent, but cowardly when opposed. (This variant is the honest-but-spineless hypothesis.)
Armed with these amendments, adherents of the prevailing paradigm can mitigate the dissonance created by anomalous outcomes. They can still gather and console themselves under the old paradigm. But the paradigm must have an elastic threshold; it cannot accommodate an infinite number of anomalous outcomes and amendments.
Sunday, September 23, 2012
The issues are in the tissues.A massage therapist once shared with me that piece of trade wisdom. She was making a point about the interplay between mental and physical discomforts. She was not the first to see a relationship between bodily and psychological experiences.
Scottish Psychiatrist R. D. Laing in the 1960s and '70s, following onto Freud and Jung, proposed that early experiences inform not only personal psychopathologies but also the myths of the tribe. He was interested particularly in myths that share a pattern with the earliest—prenatal and early postnatal—experiences and suggested that these stories might recapitulate the adventures of zygotes, embryos, and fetuses.
|Uterine Endometrium Adopting |
The Newly Arrived Blastocyst
The stories recapitulate the journeys and development of the zygote, embryo, and fetus, suggested Laing. That is, the stories parallel the prenatal story: A zygote, encased in a membrane, called the zona pellucida, travels downstream—down the fallopian tube—until, as a blastocyst, it is adopted by the uterine endometrium. Attached to the uterus, it matures into a fetus, and at the right time it is born.
Laing also cites correspondence between Freud and Jung in which the psychoanalysts discussed another natal motif, that of the doppelganger, the hero's atrophied and subordinate twin. Examples of hero/doppelganger pairs include Gilgamesh and Enkidu, Romulus and Remus, and Don Quixote and Sancho Panza. Cain and Abel could be cited. The psychoanalysts interpreted the weak or unfortunate twin as representing that lost, discarded companion, the placenta.
Jung is most associated with the idea of the collective unconscious, but even Freud toyed with the idea of a phylogenetic memory. In a manuscript he shared with colleague Sandor Ferenczi and which was published posthumously as A Phylogenetic Fantasy, Freud speculated that some psychopathologies developed as reactions to conditions that prevailed during the ice ages.
From DNA to Phenotypes
The arrival of the first neurons provides the embryo with a mechanism, prospectively, that can record experiences, that is, with a memory. But the developmental stages prior to the appearance of the first neurons must record experiences by other means (if at all). Some other means must come into play also if phylogenetic memory can be a realistic prospect.
The Masonic Pyramid, shown here as the Great Seal, searches for its capstone.
The all-seeking eye in the capstone's place has, thanks to NASA, extended its vision to the planet Mars
There, NASA's Curiosity robot explorer last week found a real treasure: The Missing Capstone, shown below.
The official story is leaked HERE. We await further developments.
Nice color close-up is posted at http://mardew.com/hires/MSL0044-2/
|Click to Enlarge|
Saturday, August 18, 2012
- It is a creationist hypothesis. (The star larvae hypothesis has no use for, nor does it address, supernaturalism, so how it qualifies as creationism is hard to figure, unless creationism has an infinitely elastic definition.)
- Its mix of ideas includes “religious creationist arguments” and “paranormal topics.” (The hypothesis includes creationist arguments only insofar as it includes arguments that are critical of the theory of natural selection, but the criticisms of natural selection have no root in any religious consideration. The hypothesis has no use for, nor does it address, paranormal topics, unless one is using “normal” in the Kuhnian sense, in which case any reference to anomalous data is a reference to something “para”normal.)
- It is guilty of “quote mining and misrepresenting the Gaia hypothesis and panspermia ideas of Fred Hoyle.” (The hypothesis cites sources in the ordinary way that such presentations do. If there’s any mining, it’s in the sidebar quotes, but those are for color. They’re not essential to the hypothesis. The accusation of misrepresentation is strange, but mudslingers tend not to aim very carefully.)
- It denies macroevolution and claims there are no transitional fossils. (This characterization could be made only by someone who has not read, or understood, the hypothesis.)
I can’t help but ponder the P.R. cliché about no publicity being bad publicity. Since the wiki entry appeared, visits to the star larvae site have ticked up a bit.
Sunday, July 08, 2012
The image of the heroic atheist is the archetypal opposite that of the religious believer. The believer is a psychological weakling, a child unable to cope with the world of rationality, of merely physical existence, and of other cold "facts" to be faced.
In Religion for Atheists, Alain de Botton, an atheist, acknowledges these images as cultural conventions and in doing so tries to lay the foundation for a rapprochement. Little in this book will hearten his fellow atheists, however. Instead, the author chooses to acknowledge, with great sympathy, the needy child in us all.
|A triumphant Madalyn Murray O'Hair slays religion.|
"Christianity describes the capacity to accept dependence as a mark of moral and spiritual health. Only the proud and vainglorious would attempt to deny their weaknesses, while the devout can declare without awkwardness, as a sign of their faith, that they have spent time in tears at the foot of a statue of a giant wooden mother. The cult of Mary recasts vulnerability as a virtue and thus corrects our habitual tendency to believe in a conclusive division between adult and childhood selves. At the same time, Christianity is appropriately delicate in the way it frames our needs. It allows us to partake of the comfort of the maternal without forcing us to face up to our lingering and inescapable desire for an actual mother. It makes no mention of our mother. It simply offers us the imaginative pleasure of being once again young, babied and cared for by a figure who is mater to the world."
There is more than a touch of Freud underlying such sentiments.
Throughout the book runs the theme of human neediness and the need to face that neediness with humility and to acknowledge the solace that religious customs and institutions provide. The author's thesis is that purely secular customs and institutions could provide the same comforts if secular society were to make the necessary social-engineering investments. But it is an act of faith to believe that, lacking theological foundations, a secular civilization could craft traditions equal in therapeutic efficacy to those crafted by the world's God-inspired religions. Whether God's existence is real or imagined doesn't bear on His capacity to inspire, or to comfort. With neither a real nor imagined God to lean on, secular society might never be able to pull off the author's therapeutic mission.
The author does identify a substantive common ground that serves the psychological needs of both the atheist unbelievers and the believers in things unseen. To the amusement and encouragement of the star larvae hypothesis, the author points to stars as a natural intersection of secular and religious concern:
"If such a process of re-evaluation [of calibrating our lives to cosmic standards] offers any common point of access open to both atheists and believers, it may be via an element in nature which is mentioned in both the Book of Job and Spinoza's Ethics: the stars. It is through their contemplation that the secular are afforded the best chance of experiencing redemptive feelings of awe. [. . . . ] Nightly -- perhaps after the main news bulletin and before the celebrity quiz -- we might observe a moment of silence in order to contemplate the 200 to 400 billion stars in our galaxy, the 100 billion galaxies and the 3 septillion stars in the universe. Whatever their value may be to science, the stars are in the end no less valuable to mankind as solutions to our megalomania, self-pity and anxiety."
To which we reply, piously, Amen. The author's instincts have delivered him to the promised land. We encourage him to cross into it.
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
Four Quartets: Little Gidding
T. S. Eliot
Friday, June 08, 2012
He proposes that advanced civilizations "go green" and integrate themselves into nature so perfectly that they remain hidden. Adapting Arthur C. Clarke's Third Law, Schroeder expresses his solution to Fermi's paradox as,
"Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from nature."Clarke rendered his law originally as,
"Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."*So, anything that stumps our powers of explanation might be an instance of
1. A supernatural process
2. A natural process
3. An advanced technology
The challenge for us is to figure out what's what. That is, if any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from nature and from magic, then any sufficiently frustrating-to-science natural process will be indistinguishable from a sufficiently advanced technology and from magic. And any instance of magic we might mistake for a complex corner of nature or an advanced technology. For now, let's reserve magic as god of the gaps.
If a civilization's technology, designed by that civilization's intelligence, ever becomes so "green" that it becomes indistinguishable from nature, then it will have ended nature as something distinguishable from technology. In such a universe we have no criteria by which to distinguish nature from advanced technologies, that is, from intelligent design. This restatement of Schroeder's point has a point, which is that we should cease debating naturalistic evolution versus intelligent design. We claim to have criteria by which to distinguish the two causes, based on their effects, but Schroeder's conjecture suggests otherwise.
The universe might be somebody's well-organized garbage dump, albeit not self-evidently so. That's one interpretation. "Nature is somebody's science project," quips the star larvae home page. Another interpretation. Alternatively, we might see the universe as somebody's art work. Or somebody's magical conjuration. Or somebody's dream. Or whatever. Are these interpretations necessarily mutually exclusive? (The star larvae hypothesis proposes above all, as did Whitehead, a biological interpretation: nature—the universe—as organism.)
The multiplicity of interpretations leads to a metaconclusion, perhaps, which is that we perceive the world through the lens of our instincts, conditioned biases, temperamental leanings and so on. Nothing profound there. But when we ponder the universe as a whole, the vastness of the object accommodates all conceptual frames. The concept of universe is an epistemological black hole.
The star larvae hypothesis embraces Schroeder's interpretation of Fermi's paradox because it points in a promising direction. But the hypothesis plays favorites. Schroeder says high-tech civilizations hide their garbage in plain view but camouflaged as nature. The star larvae hypothesis says high-tech civilizations simply ARE nature. Nature is high tech. Both narratives, though differing in their figure/ground designations, point to a common conclusion: If you want to see where technology is headed, look to nature.
The star larvae hypothesis invites us to contemplate the twinkles that dot the night sky and see the canopy not as housing, or hiding, technological civilizations but as comprising civilian technicians, engineered bodies abiding, alive.
*Clarke's first two laws, worth pondering in their own right, are (1) "When a distinguished but elderly scientist states that something is possible, he is almost certainly right. When he states that something is impossible, he is very probably wrong;" and (2) "The only way of discovering the limits of the possible is to venture a little way past them into the impossible."
Sunday, May 20, 2012
Part 2: "How Do Phenotypes Get To Be How They Get To Be? (or) Is Natural Selection Biology's Phlogiston?"
I submitted the previous blog post to Bjørn Østman's Carnival of Evolution. My submission did not please Mr. Østman, and he expressed his displeasure through comments posted on this blog. His comments were similar to those that the post received on www.thescienceforum.com. Both sources of commentary accused me of mischaracterizing the theory of natural selection. But unlike those on the forum, the comments of Mr. Østman mostly were informed and thoughtful.
Two mechanisms are proposed as the primary causal trendsetters in gene (allele) and trait distribution. These mechanisms are genetic drift, a random process, and natural selection, a nonrandom process. The latter explains the advance and retreat of traits in populations in terms of adaptation and fitness. The former explains the ebb and flow of traits in terms of chance. Given shifting trait frequencies through generations (in a local population of a given species), how does one distinguish outcomes due to natural selection from outcomes due to genetic drift?Mr. Østman explained that I had failed to distinguish between natural selection and genetic drift. These processes participate in distributing genes, but they are distinct mechanisms, according to the normal view. He offered some details about how researchers distinguish the two—that is, about how they decide when to attribute the distribution of a gene (or allele) or a phenotypic trait primarily to drift or to selection. Despite his clarifications, and I appreciate the time he took, the criteria apparently typically used to distinguish the two mechanisms seem not really to be able to do so. The argument:
Apparently one does so by determining whether a particular genotype or phenotype is more fit than a competing genotype or phenotype (in the local population of the given species). One does this by comparing the number of fertile progeny left behind by individuals with the one genotype or phenotype with the number of fertile progeny left behind by individuals with the other genotype or phenotype. The ratio is a measure of fitness of the types relative to one another. Phenotypes with similar traits also can be grouped, and averages taken.
Genotype/phenotype variants associated with a small fitness advantage (slightly better reproductive success) will tend to spread more rapidly in a small population but more slowly in a large population, due to greater opportunity for random mixing, or drift, in the large population. So, if a spreading gene or trait is associated with even a small fitness advantage, then the spread of the gene or trait in a small population can be taken to be a case natural selection. But in a large population, the advantage must be large for selection to be given credit for the spread of a gene or trait.
In other words, when the ratio of the fitness advantage to the population size crosses a threshold, then natural selection gets credit for the spread of the gene or trait, otherwise the spread is attributed to drift, or some other mechanism.
Whatever the merits of such a threshold-crossing formula, it cannot distinguish among mechanisms. Like the difference between a sluggish economy and a recession, or between the outbreak of a disease and an epidemic, or between a planet and a Pluto, the distinction between genetic drift and natural selection rests on an arbitrary threshold. It's a taxonomic distinction based on a variance from a statistical baseline. It's just a convenient way to label distribution ranges.
The differential labeling in the case of drift vs. selection is supposed to imply that a qualitative distinction is being used to distinguish two mechanisms, but nothing about the formula or its application entails that there be a qualitative distinction between or among proposed mechanisms. A difference of mechanism is implied, but there's no there there. In short, the formulas of population genetics can distinguish statistically among outcome distributions and assign labels to various distribution ranges, but that's about it.
To claim that such a formula justifies a theory of how phenotypes get to be how they get to be due to adaptation and fitness—that the formula informs us as to when changes in phenotypes are due to selection or to drift—really does beg the question, because it assumes that, among differing genotypes and phenotypes, differences in reproductive success (when they cross a statistical threshold) are DUE TO the differences among the genotypes and phenotypes of previous generations, specifically due to their relative adaptiveness. But to draw causal inferences from statistical results is some kind of logical fallacy.
I can't even say that it's assuming causation from correlation, because there's no correlation. We can't say that certain outcomes are correlated with drift and other outcomes are correlated with selection and that therefore each proposed mechanism causes the correlated outcome. The problem is that the item in question—natural selection—is taken from the outset as being a mechanism available for explaining gene distributions. Wouldn't one have to establish first that it's actually available, before one moves on to the question of which criteria distinguish it from other mechanisms? My argument is that it's not there; it's not available, unless it's just another name for the observation that some creatures enjoy more reproductive success than others, which we know is the primary cause of gene and trait distributions.
So, if natural selection cannot be the primary mechanism of macroevolution, what might be? Unlike various mechanisms that have been proposed, such as the ongoing and contingent interplay of endogenous and environmental variables called natural history ("just one damn thing after another"—this solution is proposed by Fodor and Piattelli-Palmarini in "What Darwin Got Wrong", from which I appropriated the phrase, how phenotypes get to be how they get to be), or the deliberate intervention of alien intelligences, or one of the other proposals listed HERE, the star larvae hypothesis proposes a mechanism that not only agrees with the latest discoveries in genetics, epigenetics, and the growing sense among researchers that environmental influences should be downplayed and endogenous factors emphasized in accounting for phenotypes (this is the gist of the papers collected in "Evolution, The Extended Synthesis"), but also accounts for evolution's apparent directionality.
The star larvae hypothesis proposes that evolution comprises stages of a developmental life cycle.
Monday, April 23, 2012
So far so good for the theory of natural selection. But the truisms raise a question: Why do some creatures (and some plants) enjoy more reproductive success than others?
The theory of natural selection assumes and asserts that reproductive success is a function of heritable phenotypic traits. According to the theory, variability among the heritable phenotypic traits in a local population causes the members of the population to exhibit variable reproductive success. Heritable phenotypic traits affect reproductive success by interacting with the environments in which their bearers live. A longer neck reaches higher fruits; a sharper eye detects more hidden prey, and so on. This is how traits lead to reproductive success, according to the theory.
But this explanation begs more questions. Which attributes of a creature constitute phenotypic "traits"? And why should the heritable ones be credited with determining reproductive success?
We coin a term, "trait", and identify, say, nose length, as one. We coin a term, "adaptation," and declare that a long (or short) nose is one. Its degree of adaptation relates the trait to "fitness," which determines reproductive success, which is a measure of the given creature's progeny: their number and viability and fertility.
If we measure the noses of a generation of offspring, we might find an over-representation of nose-types associated with certain members of the parental generation. Natural selection theorists would regard this outcome as testifying to the reproductive success of those members of the parental generation, which would testify to their fitness, which would testify to their being adapted, which would testify to their possessing nose lengths within some range. To repeat: Reproductive success is a function of fitness, which is a function of adaptation, which is a function of heritable traits, goes the theory.
The elaboration begs more questions: Which heritable traits are the adaptive ones? We can't say, offhand, because we can't distinguish between adaptive traits and other traits until we measure reproductive success. Once we do that, then we can credit whatever traits are overrepresented in the offspring generation with being adaptive and thereby conferring the fitness that led to the reproductive success of their earlier bearers. But we can credit traits with being adaptive only after reproductive success is measured, if we are to evaluate the theory of natural selection by its own terms.
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
Corporations, those mainstays of the so-called private sector, are, after all, progeny of the government. It is the government that grants to enterprises various legal designations by which they derive competitive advantages. These designations are the familiar titles of C-Corporation, S-Corporation, holding company, limited liability corporation, nonprofit, and so forth. Entrepreneurs regularly appeal to the government to grant them charters of incorporation or any of these other favorable designations. And this governmental bestowal of favors, which is what it is, unto enterprises constitutes governmental intrusion into markets as much as does any ostensibly "anti-business" regulatory intervention.
Suppose that a vision inspires you to design a new style of widget, and you dutifully manufacture this widget. Go ahead. Secure the equipment, install it in your garage and produce widgets. Congratulations, you are an entrepreneur, enterprising away in the private sector.
But, there's a complication . . . .
Saturday, January 07, 2012
The passage below testifies to the timeliness of Lewis' cautions. Senator Windrip is a political rising star who runs for president and whose ascendance is fueled by his skillful exploitation of jingoism and other populist sentiments. Speaking is R. C. Crowley, the local banker of Fort Beulah. He is addressing an informal gathering of the modest town's professional class. But in particular he is addressing a skeptical Doremus Jessup, the local newspaperman and the novel's protagonist.
"I don't like all these irresponsible attacks on us bankers all the time. Of course, Senator Windrip has to pretend publicly to bawl the banks out, but once he gets into power he'll give the banks their proper influence in the administration and take our expert financial advice. Yes. Why are you so afraid of the word 'Fascism,' Doremus? Just a word—just a word! And might not be so bad, with all the lazy bums we got panhandling relief nowadays, and living on my income tax and yours—not so worse to have a real Strong Man, like Hitler or Mussolini—like Napoleon or Bismarck in the good old days—and have 'em really run the country and make it efficient and prosperous again."How well does this shoe fit the politics of the United States in 2012?
Then Lewis comments on the integrity of political campaigns, when a Windrip supporter admits that the candidate's promises amount to air, "just molasses for the cockroaches."
Then there's this timely partisan snipe, from the mouth of Karl Pascal, the Communist,
". . . Freedom, Order, Security, Discipline, Strength! All those swell words that even before Windrip came in the speculators started using to protect their profits! Especially how they used the word 'Liberty'! Liberty to steal the didies off the babies! I tell you, an honest man gets sick when he hears the word "Liberty' today, after what the Republicans did to it!"I'm just sayin'.
Saturday, December 17, 2011
"Banks actually create money when they lend it. Here's how it works: Most of a bank's loans are made to its own customers and are deposited in their checking accounts. Because the loan becomes a new deposit, just like a paycheck does, the bank once again holds a small percentage of that new amount in reserve and again lends the remainder to someone else, repeating the money-creation process many times."
This sounds innocent enough, but notice the peculiar nature of the money that banks create. The money exists entirely as debt. When you take out a loan from a bank, you owe the money back to the bank. With interest.
Notice that the bank does not loan you money that it has sitting in some vault. When you take out a loan, the bank merely credits your account. It makes credit appear. In exchange for your new indebtedness (that, after all is what your loan is, a debt that you owe to the bank), you get to put up collateral, often your home.
If you pay back the loan, then the bank possesses the money (your payment), which it now owes to no one, even though your incurring a debt brought the money into existence in the first place. The bank also possesses the interest you paid.
If you don't meet the terms of the loan, then the bank takes possession of your collateral, a real asset that it acquires through no risk or sacrifice on its part.
For these reasons, it cannot be said that banks earn their money. To say that they do is to obliterate any sense of the word, "earn". The money-creation system described here (fractional reserve lending of monetized debt), subverts the capitalist virtue of earning one's money. Banks might "earn" their money, but they do not earn it. Banks are the enemy of capitalism, and the capitalist enterprise needs to rid itself of the monetary parasitism of private banking.
Sunday, November 27, 2011
The Ballad of Marshall McLuhan from Randall Acronym on Vimeo, a footnote to very good lecture, below, by McLuhan scholar Arjen Mulder, on McLuhan's ideas with commentary on his Catholicism. All from V2_, an interdisciplinary center for art and media technology in Rotterdam, Netherlands.
Sunday, October 16, 2011
The Gaia hypothesis, varying from weak to strong versions, involves the notion that Earth's biosphere actively regulates the chemistry and temperature of its fluid environment--the atmosphere and oceans--to keep the planet bio-friendly. Ward cites extreme fluctuations in atmospheric chemistry and temperature in Earth's past, ascertained from geological evidence, and proposes mechanisms by which the biosphere's own metabolic processes could have contributed to the extremes. The extremes reduced Earth's overall biomass, and, so Ward argues, the biosphere not only fails to maintain a healthy environment for itself, but positively contributes to disrupting the environment and reducing the planet's biomass. Hence, the Gaia hypothesis is disproven and Ward's Medea hypothesis, that life poisons its environment and so is inherently suicidal, is corroborated.
The argument is not convincing for a few reasons. For one thing, life always participates in anabolic (building up) and catabolic (tearing down) processes. The two feed each other, and the combined system is called metabolism. To focus on the downside is not to discredit the circuit.
Ward settles on biomass as the "bottom line" measure of the health of the biosphere. But do we assess the health of any organism solely by mass? Evolution has produced advanced technological civilization. What more could be expected from a living planet? More and more and more bacterial tonnage? Biomass per se is not an indicator of anything in particular, except biomass.
In a previous book, Ward (and co-author Donald Brownlee) suggested that glaciations serve evolution as genetic filters, weeding out the less fit. So he's familiar with the idea that die-offs can serve a constructive evolutionary purpose, even if they reduce biomass.
What Ward fails to address, and what is central to Lovelock's original idea, is the anomalous resistance of Earth's fluid environment to entropy. Why are the atmosphere and oceans not sitting stable in a state of chemical equilibrium after all these millions of years? Volcanism, mineral erosion and other geochemical processes continually stir the pot, but surely it is an oddity that the random variability never has crossed a threshold that would've sterilized Earth.
Part of Ward's problem seems to be that he fails to connect Gaia with evolution.
A fetus also pollutes its environment, and up to a point it's not a problem, because the environment not only is set up to handle the toxins, but also positively to support the developing life. Up to a point. A fetus that stays in the womb too long becomes Medean--life threatening--at which time it needs to move to a more accommodating environment.
That's the situation we're in.
Ward has no enthusiasm for space colonization, but thinks it's wiser to try to adapt to this planetary womb. Such short-sighted thinking definitely is Medean. Ward's book presents a half-baked recipe for a self-fulfilling stew.
Sunday, October 09, 2011
Friday was a great kickoff for Occupy MN.
500+ people convened in downtown Minneapolis at the
Corporate media say the movement has no concise message. But the last thing the movement needs now is a manifesto. Then it becomes about picking apart words. Keep it loose. Keep it free. And network, network, network.
Wednesday, August 03, 2011
The sell copy inside the front flap of Among the Truthers’ dust jacket calls Kay a journalist. But Among the Truthers: A Journey Through America's Growing Conspiracist Underground evinces none of the objectivity that one would expect from a journalist. Canadian Jonathan Kay is an editorial writer and columnist who has been working to debunk the 911 truth movement essentially since its arrival. This book continues his quest.
In it, Kay sallies forth with a broad brush, surveying a mélange of familiar targets of ridicule—Senator Joseph McCarthy, purveyors of tales of Atlantis, anti-Semites, skeptics questioning the authorship of Shakespeare’s works, academic deconstructionists, and others, along with 911 truthers—targets that share no logical relationship. They share only an implication of being related every time somebody utters the phrase, "conspiracy theory".
One brand of glue Kay uses to try to hold together his conspiratorial herd of cats is The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, a scurrilous document that purports to be a collection of notes taken from lectures given by Theodor Herzl, in which the outspoken Zionist outlined a Jewish takeover of the world. Outside hardcore anti-Semitic circles, the document universally is dismissed as a fake. But the Protocols surfaces again and again in Kay's narrative as if he felt a need repeatedly to smear anyone who rejects official proclamations by associating them with this example of hateful propaganda.
Digging to the historical roots of his subject, Kay observes, "British colonial rule under King George III truly was designed to keep Americans in a state of perpetual subservience, and to steal the fruits of their industry. Over time, resentment of this fact grew into a deep suspicion of government power more generally."
The Monarch’s Court might have replied to Kay’s assessment as follows:
The oppression of the king was "truly" a "fact"? No, Mr. Kay. You don't understand. Good King George sought only to protect and care for the vulnerable colonists. Conspiracy theories swirled through the colonies, and this was unfortunate, but the colonists were a peculiar sort of people, prone to delusions and paranoia. Certainly your own ruling class acts always and only in the best interests of your laborers, as did King George. Why would you imagine that the rulers of the past were differently constituted from your own? You seem to have imbibed the kool-aid of Messrs. Jefferson, Franklin and Paine. They are such rabble as needs to be debunked in a book about the wrong-headedness of mistrusting authority.During his quixotic journey, Kay effectively achieves the opposite of his intended effect, because he repeatedly admits that history provides many real-world precedents for the events and official narratives that raise eyebrows among today's conspiracy theorists, ". . . including the unsatisfying Warren commission Report on the JFK assassination, the secret bombing of Cambodia and the military cover-up of My Lai, a program of foreign coups and assassinations by the CIA, and other questionable activities officially denied and only brought to light after the fact [.]" Add to this list the Gulf of Tonkin incident and the plots hatched under Operation Northwoods, and you’ve got plenty of reasons to dismiss blanket dismissals of conspiratorial suspicion. The theorists too often are on target.
Saturday, June 11, 2011
You can read the article about the ruling class' appetite for human flesh here: http://bit.ly/kerva1
Now we know what those little hors d'oeuvres-y things at the royal wedding were. Corpse medicine.
Oooops. Early in 2012, the body of a missing teen turns up at the Queen's estate. Uh, let's call that coincidence.
What, Me Worry? - and these are the people who set sail to civilize the savages? Now Prince Charles claims a lineage that links the British Monarchy to Vlad the Impaler! The bloodline that connects the bloodthirsty royals to Vlad branches off into the Bush family. Just saying.
. . . The More They Stay The Same.
The ruling class still contracts with traffickers in human flesh. The missing money? The purchase of horrors? Recall, Rumsfeld was defense secretary under President George W. Bush.
Sunday, May 22, 2011
Tyler goes on to counter this argument by conjuring a monopolistic threat. What if the superintelligent agent wiped out its competitors? Then, under the dynamics of a monopoly, it would grow flabby and careless, because there would be no reward in making effort in any other direction. And this situation would become conducive to its yielding to the tempation to become a junkie.
It looks like the threat already has landed. The U.S. dollar/federal reserve note is the superintelligent agent Tyler warns against. The U.S. dollar has tapped it own pleasure center, and in an accelerating cycle of masturbations it has exhausted itself.
Each step in the deregulation of the U.S. banking system brought the dollar closer to its source. Finally, when the real-estate bubble burst, the fallout revealed that the originators of money, the private banks, had crossed a deregulatory threshold, and they had exploited the lifting of essentially all conditions on the granting of loans. Because banks originate dollars by crediting loans, unconditional lending became the U.S. dollar's unfettered tap into its own pleasure center, its source. Now the junkie is going through withdrawal. And if the U.S. dollar gets fired from its job as the world's reserve currency, losing its monopoly privileges? Cold turkey.
Money as superintelligent agent reveals a bias in AI theory, or at least in AI practice, insofar as AI focuses on circuits and programs and patterns of atoms. But money is pure abstraction. It can take any form: seashells, printed paper or electronic accounting entries. Higher intelligence doesn't get bogged down in precise material specifications. It is conceptual.
Consider that money can do many things that you cannot. Indeed, it uses you, and the rest of us, to do its bidding. It is not an enabler, as we're taught to think. We are its enablers. Look at the wonders it has created with our help.
The terrors that it has instigated? Our myth systems teem with wrathful deities and gods of destruction. Maybe the religious sensibility knows something about the superintelligent abstraction that provokes and persuades and thereby gives form to the world. G-d is a junkie?
Sunday, May 15, 2011
However, another case of biological descent with modification apparently does benefit, or is assumed to benefit, from a guiding plan, or program. That is the descent of various tissue types from an undifferentiated zygote during ontogeny. This poses a paradox.
If natural selection is so powerful a causal agent that it can generate all the phenotypes that make up an ecosystem, then why is it necessary to suppose that there occurs in a zygote some sort of genetic plan or program that guides development of the organism? Why not just chalk it up to natural selection -- competition and cooperation among the cells in the organism? What evidence is there of a developmental program?
All the cell types that make up the body of a complex organism share the same genotype but differ as to which genes are active and which not. And that info must be heritable, hence a source of variation ("copying errors"). But any variation among cells in an embryo might provide an advantage to some cells and/or disadvantage to others. So, the stage is set for natural selection.
The tissues that make up a complex body and their symbiotic interdependencies are just the happenstance of competition among the cells -- is that a defensible proposition? The fit survive and go on to take their place in the somatic ecosystem of the body. The unfit go extinct. A clear case of unguided evolution. No need for a developmental program.
I am NOT proposing that this is what happens. I am only asking the question: What OBSERVATION could disprove this argument -- that the cells descend with modification from their common ancestor, a zygote, through a process of variation + selection?
Saturday, April 23, 2011
Wednesday, March 09, 2011
What Darwin Got Wrong argues that the mechanism of natural selection is inadequate to this task. The book’s authors, Jerry Fodor and Massimo Piattelli-Palmarini (avowed atheists we learn), argue that Darwin overstated the power of natural selection, that it cannot account for how organisms got to be how they got to be. The authors don’t cite missing fossils of transitional forms or appeal to irreducible complexity, a la intelligent design argument. They just pick away at the putative logic of natural selection until nothing remains but grandma’s common-sense intuitions. They conclude that Darwin granted a truism wings to which it was not entitled.
The book attacks selectionism on various fronts, from its inability to field counterfactuals (if the arctic environment had been green, would polar bears have green fur?) to limitations placed on creaturely form by physical mechanics. But the star larvae hypothesis is interested primarily in the accounts of internal, or endogenous, constraints on the variability of phenotypes, the observable forms of organisms. The internal constraints leave environmental, or exogenous, influences with little from which to select. As the authors put it, natural selection at most can tune the piano; it cannot compose the melody.
The book, in short, is about the conceptual rigor, or lack of, of the NeoDarwinian theory. The Neo- part is important, because the authors support their case with findings from genetic sequencing and analysis. In particular, they lean on a new discipline called evolutionary developmental biology, or evo-devo, which has evolved from the discovery that DNA is conserved during evolution. This means that the genetic makeup of organisms, their genotypes, varies little across species, relative to the great diversity of phenotypes across species. How does a relatively limited genetic toolkit translate into so many forms of creatures? That is the question.